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TAXATION-TAx AVOIDANCE NEED ONLY BE ONE OF THE PURPOSES FOR
IMPOSITION OF Tim ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAx
Respondent, The Donruss Co., hereinafter referred to as Donruss, is
engaged in the manufacture and sale of bubble gum and candy and in the
operation of a farm. Donruss was owned by a single stockholder since 1954.
In each year from 1955 to 1961 Donruss operated profitably, increasing its
undistributed earnings from $1,021,288.58 to $1,679,315.37. During this
period the sole stockholder, Don Weiner, received no benefits other than a
salary. Donruss made no investments unrelated to its business and no div-
idends were declared. Weiner gave several reasons for Donruss' accumula-
tion policy: capital and inventory requirements, increasing costs, the risks
inherent in the particular business and in the general economy, and a general
desire to invest in Donruss' major distributor. The Internal Revenue Service
assessed accumulated earnings taxes for the years 1960 and 1961 under sec-
tions 531-537 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 Donruss paid the
tax and brought a refund suit. At the trial, the Government specifically re-
quested that the jury be instructed that:
[Ilt is not necessary that avoidance of shareholder's tax be
the sole purpose for the unreasonable accumulation; it is sufficient
if it is one of the purposes for the company's accumulation policy.2
The district court refused and instructed the jury to determine whether the
earnings and profits of Donruss were accumulated beyond its reasonable
business needs, and whether the corporation was formed or availed of for
the purpose of avoiding tax with respect to its shareholders. Judgment was
entered for Donruss. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,3 holding
that "the jury might well have been led to believe that tax avoidance must
be the sole purpose behind an accumulation in order to impose the accumu-
lated earnings tax."4 The Court of Appeals rejected the Government's pro-
posed instruction and held that the tax applied only if tax avoidance was
the "dominant, controlling, or impelling" motive for the accumulation. 5 On
certiorari to the Supreme Court, held: Reversed and remanded. The Supreme
1. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 532(a) provides in part:
The accumulated earnings tax imposed by section 531 shall apply to every
corporation ... formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax
with respect to its shareholders .. . , by permitting earnings and profits to ac-
cumulate instead of being divided or distributed.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 533(a) reads:
For purposes of section 532, the fact that the earnings and profits of a cor-
poration are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business
shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to
shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponderance of the evidence shall
prove to the contrary.
2. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 298 (1969).
3. Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1967).
4. Id. at 298.
5. Id.
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Court adopted the Government's test and ordered a new trial to determine
if tax avoidance was one of the purposes for the accumulation. United States
v. The Donruss Company, 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
The chief tax advantage of a closely held corporation is that its share-
holders are insulated from high personal income taxes in a year of abnormal
earnings or in a year which a shareholder has considerable other income.0
The purpose of the accumulated earnings tax is to compel the company to
distribute any profits not needed for the conduct of its business so that,
when distributed, individual stockholders will become liable for taxes on the
dividends received.7 This tax, therefore, discourages the use of the corporate
form as an accumulation vehicle sheltering individual stockholders from per-
sonal income taxes on corporate earnings.8 The tax was part of the original
income tax statute following the ratification of the sixteenth amendment.'
That Act imposed a tax on the shareholders of any corporation "formed or
fraudulently availed of for the purpose of" tax avoidance. 10 The section pro-
vided that accumulation beyond the reasonable needs "shall be prima facie
evidence of a fraudulent purpose to escape such tax. . . ."' The difficulties
in proving a fraudulent purpose made the tax largely ineffective, so Congress
deleted the word "fraudulently."12 In addition, the incidence of the tax was
shifted from the stockholders to the corporation itself.13 Nevertheless, these
changes were not sufficient to make the tax effective.1 4 In 1934, Congress
closed a significant loophole by exempting personal holding companies from
the accumulated earnings tax provisions and subjecting them to a tax on
undistributed earnings under separate Code provisions, regardless of the pur-
pose for the accumulation.'8 Congress made this change to alleviate the
difficulty of proving "purpose" in cases where there were partial distributions
of excess earnings and a showing of some need for retaining the remainder."0
Still, the problem of ineffective enforcement continued.'17 In 1938, the Senate
Finance Committee proposed "to strengthen this section by requiring the
6. 2 J. RABmu & M. JoHNsON, FEDALa INcomE Grer AND ESTATE TAXATION § 11.07
(1969).
7. Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693, 699 (1943).
8. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 303 (1969) [hereinafter referred to
as Donruss]. B. Brrr xa & "usTca, FERAL IcomE TAXATiON OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHA...oLDERs, § 6.01, p. 211 (2nd ed. 1966).
9. Tariff Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 114.
10. Id. § II(A) (2) at 166.
11. Id. at 167.
12. Rev. Act of 1918, § 220, 40 Stat. 1072; see S. REP. No. 617, 6Sth Cong., 3d Sess.
5 (1918).
13. Rev. Act of 1921, § 220, 42 Stat. 227. The change was prompted by the decision in
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). See H.R. REP. No. 360, 67th Cong., 1st Sss.
12-13 (1921).
14. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 304 (1969).
15. Rev. Act of 1934, §§ 102, 351, 48 Stat. 702, 751. The present Code sections are
§§ 541-47.
16. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
17. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 305 (1969).
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taxpayer by a clear preponderance of the evidence to prove the absence of
any purpose to avoid surtaxes upon shareholders after it has been determined
that the earnings and profits have been unreasonably accumulated."'18 The
change was thought to make it clear that the burden of proving intent was
to be on the taxpayer. 9 More recent changes in this area have been generally
favorable to the taxpayer,20 but no language has been added concerning the
degree of tax avoidance purpose necessary for the imposition of the tax.21
The accumulated earnings tax does not automatically attach to undistributed
income; rather, a prerequisite to imposing the tax is that the accumulation
be for the purpose of tax avoidance. 22 However, the Code assists the Gov-
ernment in proving purpose by creating a presumption of that purpose which
the taxpayer is required to rebut once the unreasonableness of the accumula-
tion is established.2 3
A conflict developed among the circuit courts as to the degree of a
tax avoidance purpose necessary for the imposition of the tax on the un-
reasonable accumulation. The First Circuit, in Young Motor Company v.
Commissioner,24 held that tax avoidance must be the primary or dominant
purpose, rejecting the view that tax avoidance need be only one of the
purposes.25 The court based its decision on the wording of section 532(a)
of the Code, pointing out that "the statute does not say 'a' purpose, but 'the'
purpose."126 The Court concluded that tax avoidance had to be dominant,
otherwise "a" would have been used. The Fifth Circuit, in Barrow Manu-
facturing Company v. Commissioner,27 held that the prohibited purpose need
only be "one" of the purposes for the failure to distribute excess earnings, re-
jecting outright the dominahce test.2 8 The court, with reference to the pre-
18. S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1938).
19. Id. at 16. The Senate's proposal was enacted. Rev. Act of 1938, § 102, 52 Stat. 483.
20. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 535 provided credits for those earnings which had a
valid business purpose. In addition, a minimum accumulation was allowed for which no tax
avoidance presumption could arise. Id. at § 535(c).
21. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 306 (1969).
22. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 532(a). Treas. Regs. § 1.532-1(a) (1) (1959).
23. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 533(a). Treas. Regs. § 1.533-1(a)(1) (1959). However,
without the benefit of the presumption, an immediate inference as to the forbidden pur-
pose may be drawn from the facts of the case. See Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co.,
318 U.S. 693 (1943). The Regulations give circumstances which may be considered: loans or
other dealings with stockholders, lack of dividend distributions, and investments having no
connection with the business. Treas. Regs. § 1.533-1(a) (2) (1959).
24. 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960).
25. Id. at 491.
26. Id.
27. 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961); cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962).
28. The Second Circuit in Trico Products Corporation v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d
424 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943), reached the same conclusion by
different reasoning. A year before Trico the Supreme Court had ruled that "a corporate
practice adopted for [non .tax avoidance] reasons may have been continued with the addi-
tional motive of [tax avoidance]." Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards, 318 U.S. 693, 696
(1943). After veiwing the tax imposed in this case, the court in Trico saw that tax avoid-
ance was not a dominant purpose in Chicago Stock Yards and thereby inferred that
dominance is unnecessary.
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sumption raised by the Code, based its decision on what Judge Learned
Hand said of the much weaker presumption contained in the Revenue Act
of 1921:20 "[a] statute which stands on the footing of the participants' state
of mind may need the support of presumption, indeed may be practically
unenforceable without it. . .. ,,30 The court in Barrow concluded: "[t]he
utility of the badly needed presumption . . . is well nigh destroyed if that
presumption in turn is saddled with the requirement of proof of 'the primary
or dominant purpose' of the accumulation." 31 An intermediate position was
adopted in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, 2 which would impose the tax
only if tax avoidance is one of the determining purposes. These cases seem
to indicate that tax avoidance had to be more than a minor, incidental pur-
pose, but not as great as dominant or controlling. The tax would not be
imposed if tax avoidance was only an "incidental" reason for the accumulation.
The majority opinion recognized that the Government's test was the
proper standard to apply, because it would eliminate most of the subjective-
ness from the area and, therefore, the accumulated earnings tax would be
simpler to enforce. The majority did not aprove of a test which would allow a
corporation to escape all penalties merely because it could convince a jury
that at least one other motive was equal to tax avoidance.83 The Court held
that to adopt taxpayer's position "would [compound] the problems that Con-
gress was trying to avoid" as there is seldom one motive or even a dominant
motive for any corporate decision.8 4 The Court felt that weighing of corporate
motives was purely subjective, could not be done with any accuracy, and
that Congress was dissatisfied with the emphasis on intent. Therefore, such a
test should be entirely avoided. The Court concluded that the dominant-
motive test would effectively destroy the presumption Congress created in
section 533(a) to meet the problem of proof on motive.85 The Court, un-
impressed with the arguments as to the meaning of the language of the
statute,3 6 examined the relevant legislative history. That history led the
29. Rev. Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 247.
30. United Business Corporation of America v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 754, 755 (2d Cir.
1933).
31. 294 F.2d at 82.
32. Kerr-Cochran Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121, 123 (8th Cir. 1958); World Pub-
lishing Company v. United States, 169 F.2d 186, 189 (10th Cir. 1948).
33. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 308 (1969).
34. Id. at 307-08.
35. Id. at 308. To support this conclusion the Court relied on the effect which judge
Learned Hand predicted for the presumption if a dominant motive test were used, and the
reasoning of the Barrow case.
36. Id. at 302. The Court rejected taxpayer's reliance on Young Motor Co. v. Com-
missioner, supra note 24. The Court found nothing in the legislative history which attached
any particular significance to the use of the article "the," nor did it find the change in the
statute from "a" to "the" helpful since they felt it signified nothing more than a change in
phraseology. The Court of Appeals in Donruss, 384 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1967) relied on certain
cases from the gift and estate tax area. The Court rejected this reliance as those cases dealt
with an entirely different situation where statutory language, history, and legislative purpose
are different.
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Court to conclude that the test proposed by the Government was consistent
with the intent of Congress and necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
tax. The history demonstrated Congressional concern with the use of the
corporate form to avoid income tax on shareholders. From its examination
the Court drew two conclusions: first, Congress recognized the tremendous
difficulty of ascertaining the purpose for corporate accumulations; second,
Cbngress saw that accumulation was often necessary for legitimate business
purposes. Congressional response to this had been to emphasize unreasonable
accumulation as the most significant factor in the incidence of the tax.3 7
Hence, if the unreasonableness of the accumulation is established, a rebuttable
presumption of tax avoidance arises without any proof on the matter. Finally,
the Court contended that purpose is still relevant because their decision
would isolate those cases in which tax avoidance motives did not contribute
to the decision to accumulate.3 8 The Court also noted that "knowledge" of
tax consequences was not the same as "purpose," and that the taxpayer
could show that its knowledge did not contribute to the decision to accumu-
late.39 The concurring opinion agreed with the Court's analysis of legislative
history and the need for relying on an objective criteria, but contended that
Congress chose to give the taxpayer a "last clear chance" to disprove tax
avoidance.40 The minority deemed this chance precluded by the majority's
framing of its instruction, for under the majority's test a jury is likely to
believe that it must find tax avoidance if the Government shows the cor-
poration accumulated earnings with knowledge of its tax consequences. The
minority considered it merely wishful thinking to expect the jury to be con-
vinced that this knowledge did not play some part in the decision to accu-
mulate. They suggested a "but for" test where the jury would be instructed
to impose the tax only if it finds that taxpayer would not have accumulated
earnings "but for" its knowledge that a tax saving would result.4 1
The Court was justified in accepting the Government's test; otherwise
parties whose purpose was tax avoidance could escape the tax if they had
the foresight to establish another reason for the accumulation. The standard
as it now stands will effectuate congressional intent. The test is so favorable
to the Government that it may go far beyond what Congress intended. 4V 2 A
corporation with excess earnings, aware of the tax consequences of a dividend
distribution, may want to retain that excess. Realizing it cannot keep the
37. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 307 (1969). This reliance is also due
to the availability of objective criteria for evaluating reasonableness.
38. Id. at 309.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 310.
41. Id. at 313.
42. As the concurrence in Donruss pointed out, the lack of a cause and effect rela-
tionship between knowledge and purpose may be quite difficult to establish. It seems that
the mere discussion of tax consequences may be an insuperable obstacle to a party at-
tempting to show that tax awareness did not contribute to the decision to accumulate.
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excess funds in the business, it may reinvest the accumulation in a valid
business purpose. Even though the original purpose may have been tax avoid-
ance, the threat of the accumulated earnings tax induced the corporation to
adopt a valid business purpose. Under Donruss, since one reason for the
accumulation was tax avoidance, the corporation may either have to pay the
tax or distribute the accumulation. The Court made no provision for a
legitimate change of purpose. The traditional method of capital investment
has been through retained earnings. The Donruss decision tends to discourage
this method of financing. There is nothing in the legislative history which
indicates Congress intended the tax to have this effect. Generally, the In-
ternal Revenue Service has assessed the tax in cases where the excess ac-
cumulations have existed for a number of years.4 3 Now, armed with the
Donruss decision, the Commissioner may start to assess the tax sooner. If
prior practice continues, the corporation will have a "grace period" in which
it can decide what to do with its excess earnings without encountering the
tax or changing its time limit for such a decision. If the Commissioner starts
to assess the tax sooner than he has in the past, it will tend to diminish the
retention of earnings and result in hurried corporate decisions, two con-
siderations the Court failed to consider in reaching its decision. Mr. Justice
Harlan, in suggesting a "but for" test, failed to recognize that this could
easily be interpreted as a dominance test. The practical effect of the Donruss
decision 44 is that the corporation will have to emphasize the reasonableness
of the accumulation of resources.45 The area will become more important if the
Commissioner initiates more cases in the area. Those marginal situations, for-
mally bypassed, may now give rise to an accumulated earnings tax assessment.
The corporation will continue to need sufficient, if not extensive, documentation
to show compliance with the tests set forth in the Regulations4 0 to prove
reasonableness. Those atypical cases where reasonableness was proven will
become increasingly important.4 The Government must be convinced that
tax avoidance never entered into the decision to accumulate. In the past,
the determination of the purpose of an accumulation received little attention.
43. But see Belaire Management Corporation, 21 T.C. 881 (1954), where the tax was
applied to a corporation in its first year of operation.
44. For a more technical evaluation see, Altman and Muchin, Supreme Court's Donruss
decision calls for a shift in tactics in 531 area, 30 J. Taxation 202 (1969).
45. I use the term "resources" because it is possible that the Commissioner may
impose the tax where he feels that the excess is hidden in other assets besides liquid
resources.
46. Treas. Regs. § 1.533-1(a) (2) gives three factors to consider in determining reason-
ableness. They are: investments by the corporation unrelated to its business, loans or
expenditures of funds by the corporation for the personal benefit of the shareholders, and
evidence of a regular dividend policy in years past.
47. Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Comm'r, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 958 (1958) (it might be all right to accumulate for purpose of buying out
minority shareholder). Gazette Publishing Co. v. Self, 103 F. Supp. 779 (D.C. Ark. 1952)
(buying out of minority interest is valid business purpose since sale of minority's interest
to outsiders could result in lack of harmony in management). See also, RSr,~cir INSTiTuTH
or AMERICA, INc., TAX COORNnATOR, Vol. 2, ff D-2800 (1966).
RECENT CASES
But today, once unreasonableness is established, the corporation can no
longer rely on the dominance test. There are some decisions which indicate
that the presumption of tax avoidance can be overcome. 4s In many, lengthy
testimony and detailed facts were presented to indicate a thorough analysis
of business needs and to demonstrate that the decision to accumulate was
not for tax avoidance purposes.49 As the law now stands a corporation will
have to prove this beyond a doubt if there is a finding its accumulation is
unreasonable.
JEROME M. HESCH
48. The Regulations acknowledge that the presumption of tax avoidance is not "abso-
lutely conclusive," so that the taxpayer may prove that the purpose was not avoidance
of income taxes on shareholders. Treas. Regs. § 1.533-1(a)(2) (1959).
49. Compare Casey v. Comm'r, 267 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1959) (deadlock on policy
grounds between two equal shareholders as to whether or not to spend surplus is a legitimate
business purpose) with Hedberg-Freidheim Contracting Co. v. Comm'r, 251 F.2d 839 (8th
Cir. 1958). Mountain State Steel Foundaries, Inc. v. Comm'r, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960),
(existence of substantial minority interest that would have objected to unreasonable ac-
cumulation might be sufficient to rebut presumption). T. C. Heyward & Co. v. United States,
18 A.F.T.R.2d 5775 (1966) (retention of large liquid reserve stemmed from controlling share-
holder's obsession a depression was imminent not tax avoidance). Kowa, Inc. v. Comm'r,
189 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1951) (conservative decisions regarding accumulations will not be
conclusive with respect to their legitimacy). The Court of Claims in Halby Chemical Co.,
180 Ct. Cl. 584 (1967), accepted the corporation's showing that it needed a reserve to
compete with the giant firms in its field. The corporation showed a need for the reserve
because of the risks it assumed in concentrating on only two products.

